AXIOM Multi-Cloud Security & Attack Path Command Center

Autonomous Cloud Penetration Testing · IAM Privilege Escalation Graphing · Multi-Cloud CSPM (AWS / Azure / GCP / EKS)

TOTAL MONITORED ASSETS

10,760 resources

Across 4 Connected Cloud Tenants

CRITICAL ATTACK PATH CHAINS

3 verified

Direct Crown Jewel Takeover Exposure

IAM PRIVILEGE ESCALATIONS

2 routes

Wildcard & AssumeRole Chokepoints

COMPLIANCE POSTURE (CIS)

89.2% average

CIS AWS/Azure/GCP Benchmark v3.0

Multi-Cloud Environment Inventory

API Agentless Live Sync

AWS-Production-Core

4819-2041-8891

AWS

Assets: 4820

CIS Score: 88.4%

2 mins ago (Agentless)3 Critical

Azure-Enterprise-Hub

sub-98a4-01fc-production

Azure

Assets: 3150

CIS Score: 91.2%

Just now (Microsoft Graph API)2 Critical

GCP-DataLake-Analytics

gcp-prod-datalake-782

GCP

Assets: 1940

CIS Score: 94%

5 mins ago (Asset Inventory)1 Critical

EKS-Global-Microservices

eks-cluster-us-east-1

Kubernetes

Assets: 850

CIS Score: 84.6%

Real-time Telemetry (eBPF)4 Critical

Active Multi-Cloud Attack Path Graph Chains

Flagship Capability: Chaining weak permissions, SSRF vectors, and IAM privilege escalations into full crown jewel takeovers.

Open Graph Studio →

Internet ALB -> SSRF -> EC2 Instance Profile -> iam:PassRole -> Production RDS DB TakeoverCRITICAL

Entry Point: Public ALB (app.expediteconsults.com:443) → Crown Jewel Target: aurora-prod-customer-db.c12x.rds.amazonaws.com (Encrypted PII)

ESTIMATED BLAST RADIUS

$4.2M Data Exfiltration & Complete Database Wipe

STEP 1Elastic Load Balancing

Public ALB / Ingress

Publicly accessible endpoint (0.0.0.0/0)

STEP 2EC2 Metadata Service

EC2 App Node (IMDSv1 Open)

IMDSv1 enabled allowing unauthenticated SSRF token theft

STEP 3IAM

Instance Profile: AppRole

Attached role possesses iam:PassRole over AdminLambda

STEP 4AWS Lambda

PrivEsc: iam:PassRole -> Lambda

Attacker passes AdministratorAccess role to Lambda function

STEP 5Amazon RDS

Production Aurora RDS DB

Holds 4.2M encrypted customer credit cards & HIPAA records

🛡️ Single Choke-Point Remediation: Remove iam:PassRole on app-workload-role & Enforce IMDSv2 (Hop Limit 1)

Apply Fix

Public Azure App Service -> Managed Identity -> Key Vault Contributor -> Global Subscription AdminCRITICAL

Entry Point: Public Azure App Service Web App → Crown Jewel Target: Enterprise Key Vault (Master Encryption Keys & Service Principals)

ESTIMATED BLAST RADIUS

Complete Azure Tenant Takeover & CMEK Revocation

STEP 1App Service

Exposed Web App Service

Public endpoint with debug console enabled

STEP 2Entra ID

System-Assigned Identity

Acquires MSI token from 127.0.0.1:41741

STEP 3Azure RBAC

PrivEsc: Key Vault Contributor

Can extract Global Admin client secrets from Key Vault

STEP 4Management Group

Global Subscription Admin

Full write access across all 18 production subscriptions

🛡️ Single Choke-Point Remediation: Remove Contributor role on Key Vault & Enforce Azure RBAC data plane permissions

Apply Fix

GKE Privileged Pod -> HostPath /var/run/docker.sock -> Node Service Account -> GCS ExfiltrationCRITICAL

Entry Point: Developer Microservice Deployment in 'default' namespace → Crown Jewel Target: gs://corporate-financial-backups-bucket (Sensitive Parquet Datalake)

ESTIMATED BLAST RADIUS

18.4 TB Customer Financial Ledger Exfiltration

STEP 1GKE Pod

Privileged Pod in Default NS

securityContext.privileged: true

STEP 2K8s Kubelet

Node HostPath Escape

Mounts /var/log & steals node bootstrap token

STEP 3Cloud IAM

Default Compute SA (Editor)

Node SA has roles/editor over whole GCP project

STEP 4Cloud Storage

Production GCS DataLake

18.4 TB unencrypted financial records

🛡️ Single Choke-Point Remediation: Enforce Pod Security Admission (restricted) & Remove editor role from GKE compute service account

Apply Fix